The United States has legitimate security concerns and responsibilities which it cannot neglect. No one is suggesting that it should. Certainly some of the invading countries had reason to be alarmed by the confusion and disorder that was engulfing Grenada at the time of the invasion, but armed invasion was not the only possible response, nor necessarily the best. However desirable the end achieved by the invasion of Grenada may have been for some governments, it is still very difficult to justify the use of regional agencies or arrangements so as to circumvent article 2(4) under the guise of regional peacekeeping action.
Conclusion
Specific instances of impermissible threat of use of force do not stem from any gaps in article 2(4). The prohibition is formulated in very clear terms.
However, the Charter treats such prohibition in the context of a comprehensive collective-security system and the recourse to methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. All aspects of that system are interrelated and equally important.
Therefore, from a strictly legal perspective, the development of a rationale for the effectiveness of the principle of the nonuse of force shall entail, inter alia, improving the functioning of the collective security system of the United Nations and the recourse to methods of settlement of disputes. It would not be realistic, however, to expect such an outcome at the present time.
On the other hand, from a close examination of recent-and not so recent-eases, one can hardly argue that article 2(4) is unworkable or outdated.
To consider article 2(4) as unworkable would be equivalent to allowing force as an instrument of international policy. That, of course, would constitute an impermissible conduct, even in the case where it is designed simply to preserve a sphere of influence or, as Professor Reisman would say, to maintain critical defense zones.
ARTICLE 2(4): THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
by 1¥. Michael Reisman* "It always lies within the power of a state," the American doctrinalist Charles Cheney Hyde wrote in 1922, even after the formation of the League of Nations, "... to gain political or other advantages over another, not merely by the employment of force, but also by direct recourse to war."1 Under traditional international law, war was a licit instrument both for vindicating international rights and for changing them. Under this regime, each state enjoyed a jus ad bellum, a right to resort, at its discretion, to war or lesser forms of coercion. Other doctrines, for example, about acquisition of territory by virtue of occupation and effective control, were consistent with this authoritative acknowledgment of the legitimate unilateral and discretionary use of force.
A system of unregulated violence-in which, in the language of the Old Testament, "each man did that which was right in his own eyes"-is inimical to optimally productive human interaction and, of course, loathsome to all but the morally defective. From Bodin and Hobbes on, the international situation was viewed by many as unde- 189 (1922) .
